Chapter 19
Your Right to Communicate with the Outside World*

A. Introduction

Prison administrators often restrict your right to communicate with courts, attorneys, family, friends, and the news media. They may also limit the types and sources of materials that you may read. Prison authorities do not, however, have absolute power to limit your right to communicate. The U.S. Constitution, state constitutions, and federal, state, and city regulations limit prison authorities’ power to restrict your access to the outside world. Upon imprisonment, you keep some constitutional rights, including some of your First Amendment protections of speech, press, and association.1 Within prisons, however, these rights can be limited under certain circumstances to accommodate the prison’s “legitimate penological interests.”2

Part B of this Chapter discusses your rights to correspond with the general public (friends, relatives, etc.). This Part first addresses the constitutional protections that apply to all prisoners in the United States. It then outlines the protections that state and federal regulations add to your right to correspond with the general public. This Chapter mainly focuses on New York State and federal law. While federal law is applicable in all of the states, your own state’s law may be different from the New York laws discussed in this Chapter and may provide you with additional protections. See Chapter 2 of the JLM for information on how to conduct thorough legal research.

Part C addresses your right to correspond with courts, public officials, and attorneys. This kind of legal correspondence is often privileged, which means it receives greater protection than correspondence with the general public. Part D discusses your right to communicate over the Internet, both directly and indirectly (through third parties). Part E provides a general outline of your right to receive publications such as magazines and books and includes a discussion of your right to receive sexually explicit materials. Part F examines your right to communicate with the news media, and Part G discusses your right to receive visitors. Finally, Part H discusses telephone access.

The validity of a prison’s restrictions on all of these rights are determined by a four-part test. Courts consider whether: (1) the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate goal of the prison; (2) there is an alternative way for the prisoner or outside communicator to exercise the right even with the restriction in place; (3) the burden or cost to the prison is too great if the right is accommodated; (4) there are available alternative procedures the prison could put in place. Restrictions on legal mail and outgoing general correspondence are not weighed under this test.3 For instance, prison officials may not arbitrarily restrict your right to communicate, but they may legally do so in circumstances where exercising that right might endanger the security or order of the prison, or the rehabilitation of prisoners. This Chapter refers to this test as the Turner reasonableness standard.

Another important term that this Chapter will use is discretion. As you will learn, although the courts will independently examine all four of the Turner factors, they often give a great deal of weight to the prison

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2. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1877, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459, 467 (1989) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 79 (1987)) (noting that the warden may only reject communication if it is determined to be detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity).


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officers’ own reasoning for the decision of whether or not to restrict your right to communicate. Black’s Law Dictionary contains this definition for discretion: “A public official’s power or right to act in certain circumstances according to personal judgment and conscience, often in an official or representative capacity.”4 This means that the courts will allow the prison officials to decide whether or not to restrict your right to communicate based on their understanding of the effect that the exercise of the particular right would have on penological interests, as long as their decision does not violate the Constitution. The reasoning is that prison officials understand the prison conditions better than judges and are therefore better able to determine how certain acts will affect the prison.

The rights this Chapter describes are about the conditions of your confinement, and are subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Because of this, if you believe your right to communicate has been improperly denied, you must first raise the problem through your institution’s administrative grievance procedure, if there is one, before you can file a federal claim. See Chapter 15 of the JLM for further information on inmate grievance procedures. If you are unsuccessful or do not receive a satisfactory result through the inmate grievance procedure, you can bring a case under a federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in federal or state court. You could choose instead to file a tort action in state court (in the Court of Claims if you are in New York), or to file an Article 78 petition in state court if you are in New York. More information on all of these types of cases can be found in Chapter 5 (on choosing a court and a lawsuit), Chapter 14 (on the Prison Litigation Reform Act), Chapter 16 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens Actions), Chapter 17 (Tort Actions), and Chapter 22 (New York’s Article 78) of the JLM.

If you decide to pursue a claim in federal court, you need to read JLM, Chapter 14, on the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Failure to follow the PLRA’s requirements can lead, among other things, to the loss of good time credits and the right to bring future claims in federal court without paying the full filing fee.

B. The Right to General (Non-Legal) Correspondence

If you are a state prisoner, your right to communicate with the outside world is protected by the U.S. Constitution, and the constitution, statutes, and regulations of the state in which you are imprisoned. If you are a federal prisoner, the U.S. Constitution, and federal statutes and regulations protect your rights.

1. Federal Constitutional Protections

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution creates a minimum level of protection of your right to communicate with the outside world. No government body may pass laws or regulations falling below this level of protection. Some states may also provide more protection of your right to communicate with the outside world, through state constitutions and statutes. The following is a discussion of the U.S. Constitution’s minimum guarantees of your right to communicate. While reading the information below, it is important to keep in mind that courts distinguish between incoming and outgoing mail. Restrictions on incoming mail are greater than on outgoing mail because incoming mail can pose a greater security threat.

In Procunier v. Martinez,5 the U.S. Supreme Court held that arbitrary censorship of both incoming and outgoing general prison correspondence (regulations preventing you from sending or receiving all or part of your mail) violated the First Amendment right to free speech of both prisoners and their correspondents.6 The Court held that censorship of prison mail was allowed only to further certain substantial government interests such as prison order, security, and rehabilitation.7 The Court also held that when some censorship was justified, the censorship could not be greater than necessary to serve valid government interests.8 This case applied to both incoming and outgoing mail.

8. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412–13, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1811, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224, 240 (1974). Note that the Supreme Court has severely limited the force of this requirement by refusing to interpret it as imposing a “least restrictive means” test. This means that lower courts will not invalidate a regulation simply because a less restrictive alternative is proposed. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 410–11, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1880, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459, 471 (1989).
But with the case *Thornburgh v. Abbott,*\(^9\) the Supreme Court partially overruled *Martinez* by specifying that the *Martinez* standard applies only to **outgoing correspondence**—correspondence sent by a prisoner to someone outside the prison. For incoming correspondence (correspondence received by a prisoner from the outside), a different standard applies. This standard comes from *Turner v. Safley,*\(^9\) and states that restrictions on incoming mail are valid if they are reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.\(^10\) Four factors must be considered in determining whether a limitation on your incoming mail meets this standard: (1) the rational connection between the mail restriction and the prison’s penological interest; (2) alternatives available to prisoners to exercise their rights; (3) the burden of accommodating rights; and (4) the lack of alternatives available to prisoners in satisfying their interests.\(^11\) The reason the *Abbott* Court gave for treating incoming and outgoing mail differently was that mail containing contraband that comes into the prison is more of a security threat than mail that leaves the prison.\(^12\)

Although the *Turner* standard may appear to be similar to the *Martinez* standard, there is a significant difference between the two. To satisfy the *Turner* standard (for incoming correspondence), prison officials must simply show the regulation could potentially achieve a legitimate goal. To meet the *Martinez* standard (for outgoing correspondence), officials must demonstrate that the restriction actually achieves an important goal. Thus, there are two main differences between the two standards: (1) the purposes that restrictions on outgoing mail are meant to serve must be important and not just legitimate; and (2) restrictions on outgoing mail must be shown to be more effective than restrictions on incoming mail need to be. As a result, it is easier to convince a judge that restrictions on outgoing mail are unconstitutional than it is to show restrictions on incoming mail are unconstitutional. The standards for incoming and outgoing correspondence are explained further below with the help of examples to indicate how courts have interpreted them.

**(a) Outgoing Correspondence**

Restrictions on outgoing, non-legal mail must further an important governmental objective, and the restriction must be no greater than necessary.\(^13\) Courts have generally upheld four important types of regulations on outgoing mail under this standard: (1) regulations banning letter kiting (including mail to a third party in your letter to someone else),\(^14\) (2) setting postage limits,\(^15\) (3) banning inmate-to-inmate correspondence,\(^16\) and (4) requiring approved correspondence lists.\(^17\)

Under New York State regulations, when the prison authorities have a reason to suspect that a prisoner is kiting mail (sending third party messages through sealed general correspondence), they may open a prisoner’s outgoing mail.\(^18\) However, they must have proof that the officials reasonably believed the prisoner was kiting mail.\(^19\) Receiving incoming kited mail is also prohibited, though it is permissible for someone to send you the writing of a minor child within an adult’s correspondence.\(^20\)

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10. *Thornburgh v. Abbott,* 490 U.S. 401, 412–14, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1881–82, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459, 473 (1989) (finding that outgoing materials are less likely to cause disorder than incoming materials and determining that incoming materials should be held to a higher standard of inspection than outgoing mail).
15. *See,* e.g., *Davidson v. Mann,* 129 F.3d 700, 702 (2d Cir. 1997).
19. *See* *Ode v. Kelly,* 159 A.D.2d 1000, 1000, 552 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (4th Dept. 1990) (finding inspection of prisoner’s outgoing mail violated his rights where the superintendent had no reason to suspect prisoner was kiting mail). *But see* *Minigan v. Irvin,* 977 F. Supp. 607, 609–10 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (permitting screening of prisoner’s outgoing mail provided there is “good cause pursuant to legitimate prison regulations and directives.”).
Courts have also held that prison authorities are permitted to restrict the amount of postage you can spend on outgoing mail. Similarly, courts have generally upheld prison policies that restrict receiving postage in the mail and providing free postage. These restrictions relate to the legitimate penological interest of security because postage stamps can be used as currency (and thus lead to increased theft and unregulated transactions) and because drugs can be smuggled on stamps.

Many prisons completely ban inmate-to-inmate correspondence, and these restrictions have generally been upheld as reasonably relating to prison security. As inmate-to-inmate correspondence involves both outgoing and incoming correspondence, it presents a slightly different case from purely outgoing mail. But, because only the rights of prisoners and not those of the general public are involved, the courts are generally not as concerned about the restriction of rights. Inmate-to-inmate correspondence was at issue in Turner v. Safley, in which the Supreme Court announced the reasonable relation standard that is applied in all incoming correspondence cases and even in many outgoing correspondence cases. In addition, courts have also found restrictions barring correspondence between current and former inmates to be constitutional because they are rationally related to security interests such as preventing escapes and violent acts. Whether “approved correspondence lists” for outgoing non-legal mail are constitutional is unclear. In Milburn v. McNiff, a New York court found unconstitutional a policy requiring prisoners who wanted to communicate with people not on their “approved correspondence lists” to submit a “request to correspond form” to the addressee. On the other hand, various federal district courts have found such a regulation to be “a reasonable method of maintaining prison security without undue restriction on the First Amendment rights of prisoners.” Such lists, of course, must pass Martinez and have only been upheld when a substantial penological (prison-related) interest in security or rehabilitation is involved. In New York, state courts might follow McNiff and prohibit the use of this type of list all together. But, in other states or in federal court, the lists may be upheld, provided they are legitimately used to further prison security or rehabilitation.

In addition to the above, you generally must provide a return address on all outgoing mail. Finally, courts do not allow prison officials to censor and discipline prisoners based on statements in mail that are intended to insult prison personnel, even if such statements would be prohibited if expressed

21. See Gittens v. Sullivan, 670 F. Supp. 119, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding $1.10 per week for stamps and an additional advance of $36 for legal mailings satisfied the constitutional minimum for access to the courts); see also Davidson v. Mann, 129 F.3d 700, 702 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding limits on prisoner’s access to stamps for non-legal mail).
24. See, e.g., Purnell v. Lord, 952 F.2d 679, 683 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding restriction on correspondence between inmates at different facilities reasonably related to security interests); Farrell v. Peters, 951 F.2d 862, 863 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding preventing correspondence between inmates reasonably related to security).
28. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 791 (D.R.I. 1970); see also George v. Smith, No. 05-C-403-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16139, at *20 (D. Wis. Aug. 2, 2005) (unpublished) (“In the interest of maintaining prison security, prison officials may lawfully limit an inmate to corresponding with individuals on a pre-approved list.”). But see Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 276 (D. Md. 1972) (criticizing the broad prohibition on reading inmate mail in Palmigiano v. Travisono); Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 755 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding unconstitutional a policy limiting letters sent by prisoners to family and an approved list of ten individuals because it is not essential to further legitimate security interests and is often abused as applied); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corr., 505 F.2d 194, 211–12 (8th Cir. 1974) (rejecting an approved correspondence list procedure because the following justifications were not enough: prospectively investigating potential visitors, universally prohibiting correspondence with former inmates, and assuring that no unwanted mail was received by unapproved recipients).
29. See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corr., 505 F.2d 194, 211 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding an approved correspondence list unconstitutional where the prison justified it as pre-screening potential visitors and protecting those who might not want to receive mail from prisoners).
30. Cf. United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 110–11 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding as serving security interests the unique, severe restrictions on mail and visitation to a court-approved list for gang member convicted of racketeering).
31. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 540.14(e)(1)(iv) (2007) (staff at a minimum- or low-security federal prison may open the prisoner’s outgoing mail if the prisoner has not filled out the return address properly); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 720.3(6) (2005) (requiring New York State prisoners to include their return addresses on outgoing mail).
verbally.\textsuperscript{32} Courts have also upheld regulations that call for the routine inspection of all non-legal outgoing mail.\textsuperscript{33} They have distinguished between censorship and inspection for security reasons.\textsuperscript{34} One court has even upheld the censorship of outgoing mail under the \textit{Martinez} standard.\textsuperscript{35}

When the regulation at issue involves both incoming and outgoing correspondence, courts have applied the \textit{Turner} standard.\textsuperscript{36} A few courts have even departed entirely from the \textit{Martinez} standard, instead applying the \textit{Turner} reasonableness standard to outgoing mail as well. In general, courts are increasingly accepting of prison officials’ reasons for placing restrictions on outgoing correspondence.\textsuperscript{37}

(b) Incoming Correspondence

Regarding the restriction of incoming correspondence (mail and publications sent to you), the Court in \textit{Thornburgh v. Abbott} held that the proper standard of review was the one stated in \textit{Turner v. Safley}.\textsuperscript{38} In \textit{Turner}, the Court held that “[w]here the regulations at issue concern the entry of materials into the prison, . . . a regulation that gives prison authorities broad discretion is appropriate.”\textsuperscript{39} Under the \textit{Turner} standard, restrictions are valid if they are reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest (for example, security, order, or rehabilitation). This “reasonably related” standard is more general than the \textit{Martinez} standard and less protective of your right to communicate.

The Court has identified four factors for determining whether a restriction meets the reasonably related standard. The first and most important factor is whether the regulation is both neutral and rationally related to the alleged legitimate government interest.\textsuperscript{40} This factor can be broken down into three subparts:

1. Whether the government interest or goal is legitimate;
2. Whether the regulation is rationally related to that interest or goal; and
3. Whether the regulation is neutral.

32. Cases where prisoners are not certain if their defamatory (insulting) comments will be read should be treated differently than cases involving defamatory comments directed at prison officials. \textit{See Loggins v. Delo}, 999 F.2d 364, 367 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that prison official violated prisoner’s 1st Amendment rights by disciplining a prisoner after reading a prisoner’s letter to his brother that commented about prison guards where the letter did not raise a security risk and was not directed towards staff); \textit{Brooks v. Andolina}, 826 F.2d 1266, 1268 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding no government interest in censorship); \textit{Hall v. Curran}, 818 F.2d 1040, 1044–45 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding the district court should not have granted summary judgment to prison administrator against a prisoner’s 1st Amendment claim for censorship of his statements critical of prison administration). \textit{But see} \textit{Leonard v. Nix}, 55 F.3d 370, 376 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that prisoners cannot send letters as personal communication that are extremely offensive to prison personnel if their purpose is only to defame (insult) prison personnel and not to communicate).

33. \textit{Bell-Bey v. Williams}, 87 F.3d 832, 838 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a mail inspection procedure did not violate a prisoner’s 1st Amendment rights because the procedure was limited to protecting the legitimate government interest of managing limited prison resources: \textit{Stow v. Grimaldi}, 993 F.2d 1002, 1004 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that inspection procedures served the legitimate government interest of safety).

34. \textit{Altizer v. Deeds}, 191 F.3d 540, 549 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that inspection of prisoner’s mail was not a constitutional violation since there is a substantial government interest in censoring materials harmful to security).


36. \textit{See Duamutef v. Hollins}, 297 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding mail watch on all incoming and outgoing mail based on \textit{Turner} standard as furthering the government interest of security where inflammatory material had previously circulated through the mail: \textit{Sisneros v. Nix}, 884 F. Supp. 1313, 1331–33 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (upholding under the \textit{Turner} standard a regulation that prohibited the delivery to or from a prisoner of letters written in a language other than English, unless that language was the only one a prisoner spoke); \textit{Martin v. Rison}, 741 F. Supp. 1406, 1413, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (upholding a regulation that prohibited prisoners from acting as reporters for newspapers published outside the prison: the court based its decision in part on the fact that the article, although published outside the prison, was read within the prison and caused agitation amongst prisoners resulting in a need for security adjustment, and meritng application of the \textit{Turner} standard to the regulation).

37. \textit{Perry v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr.}, 664 F.3d 1359, 1365 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing \textit{Turner} standard as basis for reviewing prisoners’ solicitation of pen pals); \textit{Butti v. Unger}, No. 04-5381, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14408, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2005) (unpublished) (citing \textit{Turner} standard as basis for surveillance of prisoner’s outgoing mail when officials were suspicious of prisoner’s creating fake names to send mail to recipients other than those the letters addressed).


Subpart (1), government interest in restricting mail, is usually either maintenance of prison security or screening for contraband. Courts almost always hold these two interests legitimate.\(^{41}\) For subpart (2), under the Turner standard, the relationship between a mail restriction and the stated government interest does not need to be very close. Prisons do not need to prove the restrictions will actually promote security or screen contraband in all cases: they only need to convince the court that the restriction might achieve these goals. Courts usually find the government’s argument to be valid.\(^{42}\) Nevertheless, when a court does invalidate a mail restriction, it does so usually because there is no rational relationship between the restriction and the government interest.\(^{43}\) Finally, for subpart (3), regulations are considered neutral when the government interest is unrelated to suppressing expression. In other words, the restriction is neutral as long as the purpose of the restriction is something other than to stop you from expressing yourself.\(^{44}\)

The second factor of the reasonably related standard is whether the regulation leaves the prisoner with another way to exercise the asserted right.\(^ {45}\) Courts usually define the right broadly, which makes it easier to find some way for the prisoner to still exercise that right. For example, the regulation in Thornburgh v. Abbott prohibited publications containing sexually explicit material. Instead of defining the right in question as the right to receive sexually explicit materials, the court defined the right more broadly as the right to expression, which it held could be exercised through the many other publications that were not prohibited.\(^ {46}\)

The third and fourth factors are usually interrelated. The third factor is the impact that accommodating the right will have on other prisoners, guards, and prison resources. The fourth factor is whether there are any ready alternatives to the proposed regulation.\(^ {47}\) Because the accommodation of a right will usually require alternatives to the regulation, these two factors are often combined. For example, accommodating a prisoner’s right to receive blank greeting cards from non-vendors would require extensive searches of more incoming mail. Such searches may be considered both an unacceptable impact of the accommodation of the right and an unacceptable alternative to the regulation at issue.\(^ {48}\)

(c) “As Applied” versus “Facial” Challenges

Most cases discussed in this Chapter so far involve facial challenges—challenges to the regulation as written. But, because many prison regulations are vague, it is often hard for judges to object to them. In such cases, prisoners may instead bring an as applied challenge. As applied challenges occur when a prisoner objects to the way prison officials apply a regulation to him, rather than to the regulation itself. Nichols v. Nix\(^ {49}\) and Lyon v. Grossheim\(^ {50}\) are good examples of as applied challenges to prison policies.\(^ {51}\) In both cases, the regulation at issue gave the superintendent power to deny a prisoner any publication likely to be disruptive or to produce violence. The court upheld the regulation as it was written because it facially passed the Turner standard: Preventing disruptions and violence is always a legitimate goal, and the

\(^{41}\) See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495, 502 (1974) (“[C]entral to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.”).

\(^{42}\) E.g., Avery v. Powell, 806 F. Supp. 7, 7–8 (D.N.H. 1992) (finding a regulation that prohibited prisoners from receiving blank greeting cards from anyone other than the vendor to be rationally connected to the interests of promoting security and screening for contraband: the court noted that cards are often multipart, contained within envelopes, or decorated with metals or flammable substances, so cards received from non-vendors would necessitate time-consuming searches).

\(^{43}\) See, e.g., Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 960–61 (9th Cir. 1999) (invalidating a regulation that limited the publications prisoners can receive to those ordered and paid for directly by the prisoner because the court found no rational relation between the regulation and the asserted interests of screening for contraband, minimizing fire hazards, or preventing overcrowding).


\(^{49}\) Nichols v. Nix, 810 F. Supp. 1448, 1467 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (striking down a regulation as it was used to restrict publications that promoted racial segregation).

\(^{50}\) Lyon v. Grossheim, 803 F. Supp. 1538, 1555 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (invalidating an official action denying prisoners access to “anti-Catholic” comic books which also contained negative references to homosexuality and the Soviet Union).

\(^{51}\) The cases were both decided in the Southern District of Iowa. Though they are only binding on prisons in that district, they provide good examples of as-applied challenges that you can bring elsewhere.
regulation only applies to publications that are likely to hinder this goal. However, the court held that prison officials applied the regulation in an unconstitutional manner. In both cases, the court found that there was no evidence that the publications at issue were likely to threaten prison security because other prisoners had possessed similar publications without incident.\footnote{Nichols v. Nix, 810 F. Supp. 1448, 1463 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (“[T]he record is...devoid of evidence of past inmate confrontations as a result of other inmates possessing or reading [such] publications.”); Lyon v. Grossheim, 803 F. Supp. 1538, 1552 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (“There is...no evidence of past confrontations as a result of other inmates possessing or reading [such] publications.”).}

If you think a prison policy is being applied in an unconstitutional way, you can challenge it even though it may look, as written, like policies that courts have upheld in the past.

(d) Procedural Safeguards

Note that several important procedural safeguards established by \textit{Procunier v. Martinez}\footnote{Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 418 (1974).} must still be respected by prison officials. First, a prisoner should be notified if prison officials return a letter addressed to him or if a letter by a prisoner is returned to the prison. Second, the author of the returned letter should be given a reasonable opportunity to protest the decision to restrict.\footnote{JLM, Chapter 2, “Introduction to Legal Research,” will be helpful in conducting this research.}

\textbf{2. State and Federal Protections of the Right to General (Non-Legal) Correspondence}

State and federal regulations may give you more rights than those the U.S. Constitution provides—they cannot take away any rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but they can provide more than the Constitution does. The following is a discussion of New York State and City regulations, as well as federal regulations governing your right to communicate in writing with the general public. Prisoners in other states must consult their state and local regulations.\footnote{See Sheldon Krantz, \textit{The Law of Corrections and Prisoners’ Rights in a Nutshell} § 17, at 142 (3d ed. 1988).}

(a) New York State and City Regulations

In New York, the specific regulations governing your right to communicate with the outside world depend on the type of institution in which you are imprisoned. There are three different sets of regulations. One set applies only to prisons run by the New York State Department of Correctional Services (for example, Attica). The second applies to all city and county prisons and jails (for example, Nassau County Jail), and the third applies only to New York City prisons and jails (for example, Rikers Island). The Department of Correctional Services issued the first set of regulations: the New York State Commission of Correction, the second; and the New York City Department of Correction and/or the Board of Correction, the third. If you are in a New York City jail, both the second and third sets of regulations apply to you. If more than one set of regulations applies to you, courts will use the one that gives you more protection.

New York State regulations, which apply to prisons run by the Department of Correctional Services, provide protections to your right to communicate beyond the minimum required by the Constitution. These regulations allow prisoners, with some restrictions, to correspond with any person.\footnote{N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 720.3 (2013).} State regulations only prohibit prisoners from corresponding with people who have indicated they do not wish to receive mail from the prisoner or with persons listed on a court order of protection.\footnote{N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 720.3(a) (2013).} Furthermore, prisoners must receive advance approval in order to correspond with unrelated minors, persons on parole or probation, other New York prisoners, employees or former employees of the Department of Correctional Services, and victims of the prisoner’s crime(s).\footnote{N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 720.3(b) (2013).} State regulations also prohibit prison officials from opening, inspecting, or reading outgoing correspondence (except for oversized envelopes, parcels, and prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence) without written authorization from the facility superintendent.\footnote{N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, §§ 720.3(c)–(e) (2013).} The superintendent cannot provide such authorization unless there is a reason to believe that the correspondence violates the department’s
regulations or that it threatens the safety, security, or good order of the prison. If authorization is given, the superintendent must set forth, in writing, the specific facts justifying it.\textsuperscript{60}

With respect to incoming mail, New York State regulations require the inspection of all such mail,\textsuperscript{61} but prohibit the reading of incoming correspondence (except for prisoner-to-prisoner letters and prisoner business mail) unless there is evidence that the mail contains plans for sending contraband in or out of the prison, plans for criminal activity, or information that would create a danger to others or to the prison’s security and good order.\textsuperscript{62} The facility superintendent must provide written authorization to read incoming correspondence and must specify why reading the mail is necessary.\textsuperscript{63} It is also important to be aware of your facility’s specific restrictions on what can be sent through the mail: failing to follow these rules can result in your mail not reaching you.\textsuperscript{64}

The local county jail regulations also provide protections.\textsuperscript{65} These regulations provide that you may correspond, with a few restrictions, with anyone you wish. Prison officials may not impose restrictions based on the amount of mail sent or received, or based on the language in which the correspondence is written.\textsuperscript{66} Outgoing correspondence may not be opened or read unless the chief administrative officer gives written approval based on a “reasonable suspicion” that the correspondence threatens the security of the prison or of another person.\textsuperscript{67} Incoming correspondence may be opened outside the presence of the prisoner-recipient to ensure the absence of contraband, but it may not be read without the written approval of the chief administrative officer.\textsuperscript{68} Any information prison officials obtain by opening your incoming correspondence without the superintendent’s authorization may not be used in a disciplinary hearing against you.\textsuperscript{69}

New York City has additional standards set out in the “Minimum Standards for New York City Correctional Facilities.”\textsuperscript{70} New York City prisoners are urged to familiarize themselves with these standards. Find out if your prison library has a copy; if it does not, ask the librarian to get one. Copies of “Minimum Standards” can be obtained by writing to:

City of New York  
Board of Correction  
51 Chambers Street, Room 923  
New York, NY 10007

The Board of Correction approved changes to these standards in early 2008: these revisions are the first since the Minimum Standards were enacted in 1978.\textsuperscript{71} These changes, which have implications for mail and telephone surveillance in New York City facilities,\textsuperscript{72} went into effect on June 16, 2008.\textsuperscript{73}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{60} N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 720.3(a)(1) (2013).
\item \textsuperscript{61} N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 720.4(a)(2) (2013).
\item \textsuperscript{62} N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 720.4(e) (2013).
\item \textsuperscript{63} N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 720.4(f) (2013).
\item \textsuperscript{64} Items prohibited in incoming correspondence include obscene, threatening, or fraudulent materials, nude photographs, Polaroid pictures, postage stamps, and letters from others (kiting) except minor children. There is also a five-page limit on incoming correspondence. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, §§ 720.4(c)–(d) (2008). See http://www.docs.state.ny.us/directives/4911.pdf for additional restrictions on packages brought or sent to you in prison.
\item \textsuperscript{65} N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 7004 (2008).
\item \textsuperscript{66} N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 7004.10(b) (2008).
\item \textsuperscript{67} N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, §§ 7004.2 (f)–(g) (2008).
\item \textsuperscript{68} N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, §§ 7004.3 (a)–(b) (2008).
\item \textsuperscript{69} See Chavis v. Goord, 265 A.D.2d 798, 798, 697 N.Y.S.2d 409, 410 (4th Dept. 1999) (reversing a disciplinary decision because prison investigation relied on information obtained through unauthorized review of prisoner’s mail).
\item \textsuperscript{70} Codified at Chapter 1 of Title 40 of the Rules of the City of New York, available at http://24.97.137.100/nycrceny/entered.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
\item \textsuperscript{72} For instance, an amendment to § 1-10(h) allows correctional facilities to monitor prisoner phone calls with prior notice but without a warrant (with the exception of calls to attorneys, physicians, and like parties). An amendment to § 1-11(c)(6) and (o)(1) allows prison officials to read general correspondence with a warden’s written order instead of only with a court order. An amendment to § 1-11(a) allows curtailment of general correspondence privileges where reasonably necessary to protect public safety or maintain prison security. See
\end{itemize}
(b) Federal Regulations

If you are a federal prisoner (in a prison run by the Bureau of Prisons), you are subject to mail regulations the Federal Bureau of Prisons has issued. Some rules concerning general correspondence follow.

The warden of each prison has the authority to establish your rules of correspondence. The specific rules the warden develops must be communicated to you in writing upon arrival at the prison. Prison authorities may open and read your mail if they determine doing so is necessary to maintain security or monitor a specific problem. They may not read mail that is “special” or “privileged,” although they may open it (in your presence only) to ensure that there is no contraband in the envelope. “Special” or “privileged” mail includes mail from attorneys, law enforcement officers, courts, and public officials. Regulations governing privileged mail are discussed further in Part C of this Chapter.

Prison officials may not open and read mail you are sending from a minimum- or low-security prison unless they have “reason to believe [the mail] would interfere with the orderly running [of the prison], that it would be threatening to the recipient, or that it would facilitate criminal activity.” In medium- and high-security institutions, prison officials may read all mail other than “special mail.”

Federal prisons must supply you with paper and envelopes at no cost, but you must pay for stamps. If you cannot afford postage, the warden must provide stamps for a reasonable number of letters per month. For more information and details about the federal regulations, you should consult the relevant regulations themselves. They can be found in the Code of Federal Regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 540.

3. A Note on Foreign-Language Materials

The ability of prisons to restrict correspondence in foreign languages remains unclear. Some courts have found that regulations prohibiting prisoners from writing and receiving letters in languages that cannot be understood by prison officials are permissible as reasonably related to the legitimate prison interest of security. On the other hand, some courts have held that a complete ban on all foreign-language correspondence is not rational. Additionally, some courts have found the exclusion of foreign-language publications unreasonable under this standard. By statute in New York State, prison officials may not impose restrictions based on the language in which the mail is written. Make sure to check statutes, regulations, and court decisions in your state to find out what the law is.


74. 28 C.F.R. § 540.10 (2007).
75. 28 C.F.R. § 540.12(b) (2007).
78. 28 C.F.R. § 540.14 (c)(1)(i) (2007). Prison authorities can also read this mail if you are on a restricted correspondence list, if the mail is being sent to another prisoner, or if the return address on the envelope is incomplete. 28 C.F.R. §§ 540.14 (c)(1)(ii)–(iv) (2007).
80. 28 C.F.R. §§ 540.21(a), (b), (d), (e) (2007). See also Gittens v. Sullivan, 670 F. Supp. 119, 121, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding reasonable the provision of an amount equal to five free stamps per week for all correspondence, in addition to a $20 advance for legal mail, where the superintendent may advance additional funds for postage on legal mail if the prisoner exceeds the twenty dollar limit), aff’d, 848 F.2d 389 (2nd Cir. 1988).
81. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fort Dodge Corr. Facility, 368 F.3d 1024, 1026–27 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding acceptable a regulation that prohibited inmates from writing letters in Spanish absent a ready alternative interpreter option). See also Sisneros v. Nix, 884 F. Supp. 1313, 1331–33 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (upholding a regulation that prohibited the delivery of letters to or from a prisoner written in a language other than English unless that language was the only one spoken by a prisoner), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 95 F.3d 749, 750 (8th Cir. 1996); Nelson v. Woodford, No. C 04-03684 CRB (PR), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11120, at *25–30 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2006) (stating that a ban on foreign-language publications was rationally related to the security goal of preventing coded communication by gangs), aff’d, 249 Fed. Appx. 529, 530 (9th Cir. 2007).
82. Thongvanh v. Thalacker, 17 F.3d 256, 259 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that since the prison could have secured free translation services, the ban on a Lao prisoner’s correspondence was not rational).
83. See, e.g., Kikimura v. Turner, 28 F.3d 592, 598–600 (7th Cir. 1994) (invalidating a complete ban on foreign-language materials).
C. Legal Correspondence with Courts, Public Officials, and Attorneys: Privileged Correspondence

Under Procurier v. Martinez and Thornburgh v. Abbott, two important cases discussed in Part B(1) of this Chapter, both legal and non-legal correspondence generally receive protection under the First Amendment. However, correspondence with courts, public officials, and attorneys ("legal mail") receives heightened protection because censorship of this mail implicates two other important concerns: your right of meaningful access to the courts and the attorney-client privilege. This Section discusses each of these sources of protection separately. Mail to and from attorneys, courts, paralegals, and legal organizations is treated as privileged and receives heightened protection (for instance, this mail cannot usually be censored). Mail to and from other public officials and agencies, such as U.S. Congressmen and the Department of Justice, is also usually treated as privileged and given greater protection than regular mail.

1. First Amendment Protections

Some courts have held that legal mail is entitled to a higher degree of First Amendment protection than other mail and that "prison policies or practices which interfere with legal mail on a regular basis ... must be supported by a legitimate penological interest other than mere general security concerns which permit interference with regular mail." Even when this analysis is not applied, courts generally give legal mail more consideration than non-legal mail in evaluating restrictions.

(c) Incoming Legal Correspondence

Correspondence from your attorney is incoming mail, and so restrictions on it are evaluated under the Turner standard. Restrictions on privileged incoming mail do not violate the First Amendment if the restrictions are reasonably related to a legitimate need to manage the prison or carry out your penalty. In Wolff v. McDonnell, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state can require your lawyer to clearly mark her letters as coming from an attorney, and can require that her address be written on the envelope if the letters are to receive special treatment, and, finally, can require your lawyer to identify herself to prison officials before correspondence with the prisoner begins. For example, in 2009, the Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals denied a prisoner's constitutional claims because the return address on his legal mail did not indicate that it came from an attorney, a valid prerequisite under California law for legal mail to receive special treatment. Wolff seems to imply that prison officials cannot read or censor correspondence with your attorney if there is no suspicion that the correspondence is illegal, but this is not entirely clear. According to Wolff, a requirement that letters from an attorney to a prisoner be opened by prison officials only in the presence of the prisoner may be more than what the Constitution demands.

88. Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) ("In balancing the competing interests implicated in restrictions on prison mail, courts have consistently afforded greater protection to legal mail than to non-legal mail . . . ."); Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2003) ("When the incoming mail is "legal mail," we have heightened concern with allowing prison officials unfettered discretion to open and read an inmate's mail because a prison's security needs do not automatically trump a prisoner's First Amendment right to receive mail, especially correspondence that impacts upon or has import for the prisoner's legal rights, the attorney-client privilege, or the right of access to the courts.").
94. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2985, 41 L. Ed. 2d 925, 963 (1974) ("As to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such communications, since the inmate's presence ensures that prison officials will not read the mail.").
95. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2985, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 963 (1974); see also Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 825 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding "that the violation of the prison regulation requiring that a prisoner
however, many courts have ruled that the prisoner must be present if the prison is opening his letters, or that the prisoner at least be given the opportunity to request such a safeguard.\(^{96}\)

(d) Outgoing Legal Correspondence

Prisons cannot restrict correspondence sent to attorneys unless the restriction furthers an important or substantial governmental interest.\(^{97}\) Some courts have found that outgoing legal correspondence does not present the same security threat as non-legal correspondence, and so there is minimal government interest in restricting it.\(^{98}\) Letters to some government agencies, elected officials, and legal assistance and civil liberties groups enjoy the same protection as mail addressed to your attorney.\(^{99}\) Also, the government has a duty to provide indigent prisoners with stationery and a reasonable amount of postage for legal mail.\(^{100}\)

However, one federal district court case found that a ten-day delay in sending a prisoner’s legal mail did not be present when his incoming legal mail is opened and inspected is not a violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights.

96. See Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2003) (reaffirming that an opt-in policy, where a prisoner had to request being present when legal mail was opened, is constitutional so long as the prisoner is given written notice of it);\(^{101}\) Bach v. Illinois, 504 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (holding that because “prison officials in inspecting incoming mail outside the presence of an inmate are provided with an opportunity to obtain advanced warning of potential litigation which might involve the prison and, more significantly, could become privy to stratagems being formulated between attorney and client with regard to pending litigation,” the prisoner is entitled to be present during the opening of legal mail addressed to him). Later cases with similar holdings to Bach include Powells v. Minnehaha County Sheriff Dept., 198 F.3d 711, 712 (8th Cir. 1999):\(^{102}\) Fortroy v. Beard, 485 F. Supp. 2d 592, 593, 601 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that a Pennsylvania policy allowing prison staff to open incoming legal mail outside prisoners’ presence is unconstitutional); and Kensa v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 174 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a prisoner’s right to be present during opening of his legal mail extends to hand-delivered correspondence as well as correspondence received through the U.S. Postal Service). But see John v. New York City Dept. of Corr., 183 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing prisoner’s claim for denial of access to courts when prison officials opened mail outside his presence because he failed to prove either that the officials acted “deliberately and maliciously” in doing so or that he suffered any injury).


98. See Cancel v. Goord, No. 00 Civ. 2042 (LMM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3440, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2001) (unpublished) (finding that without more than general security interests, interference with outgoing legal mail is unconstitutional) (citing Davidson v. Scully, 694 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1982)); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 473–475, 480 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that censoring outgoing mail to attorneys, the courts or to government agencies is not significantly related to the advancement of jail security and thus unconstitutional);\(^{103}\) Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 792 (D.R.I. 1970) (holding that the reading of any outgoing mail violates the 1st Amendment unless pursuant to a duly obtained search warrant).

99. See Davidson v. Scully, 694 F.2d 50, 53–54 (2d Cir. 1982) (striking down regulation restricting outgoing mail to government agencies because “[i]f prison officials are able to deny inmates free access to public officials and agencies, the fundamental right [of access to the courts] is restricted just as surely as if the government denied prisoners access to traditional legal materials. In many cases an inmate’s claim might be substantially furthered by information or aid available through government agencies.”). But see O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding regulation treating grievance mail to state agencies as non-legal); Jackson v. Mowery, 743 F. Supp. 600, 606 (D. Ind. 1990) (“[T]he legal mail protected by the Constitution extends only to safeguard communications between an inmate and his attorney, and [defendant] has no basis for his claim of interference with ‘legal mail’ to and from his family and friends.”).

100. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824–25, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 1496, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72, 81 (1977) (stating that it is “indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents with notary services to swear them, and with stamps to mail them.”). But see Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1308 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Bach v. Coughlin, 508 F.2d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 1974)) (explaining that while prisoners have a right to access the courts, they are not entitled to unlimited free postage, and prison officials can balance prisoners’ rights to use the mails against budgetary concerns); Chandler v. Coughlin, 763 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that state is not required to provide indigent prisoners unlimited free postage, but only a “reasonably adequate” amount of postage for access to the courts); Gittens v. Sullivan, 670 F.Supp. 119, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that “[$1.10 per week for stamps and an additional advance of $36.00 for legal mailings satisfies the constitutional minimum for access to the courts”), aff’d, 848 F.2d 389, 390 (2d Cir. 1988). Even though this right has been cut back somewhat, the Court has clearly held that a state violates prisoners’ fundamental constitutional rights of access to the courts by failing to provide them with adequate legal library facilities. The right of access to the courts requires that prison officials assist prisoners in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing law libraries and adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72, 83 (1977).
violate his limited constitutional right to freedom of association. The mail was initially delayed because of insufficient funds on two occasions.

2. Your Right to Meaningful Access to the Courts and Assistance of Counsel

You have a constitutional right to meaningful court access and assistance of counsel. In Davidson v. Scully, the Second Circuit held that restrictions on a prisoner’s legal mail can violate this right. For example, courts have stated that allowing prison officials to read mail to courts or between attorneys and prisoners can prevent prisoners from bringing abuses to the attention of courts because they fear retaliation. Thus, even if your First Amendment claim fails because the restriction at issue is related to an important government objective, you can still challenge the restriction if it prevents you from having meaningful court access.

However, these claims will likely not succeed unless you also prove that there was some actual harm to your ability to assert a legal claim. In one recent New York case, the district court reiterated that to state a claim for denial of access to the courts, the prisoner must show that the defendant’s actions actually hindered his pursuit of legal claims and caused actual injury. The court determined that the prisoner in this case experienced only inconvenience and a delay in sending outgoing mail, neither of which reach the threshold. Some courts have also required that the interference be “deliberate and malicious.” In other words, they require that the prison authorities have intentionally interfered with a prisoner’s legal mail with

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103. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821–23, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 1494–95, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72, 78–80 (1977) (reviewing the history of Supreme Court decisions that have established a right of access to the courts and the assistance of counsel). But see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2180, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606, 618 (1996) (holding that a prisoner must prove that lack of necessary legal assistance or library actually hindered case). See Chapter 12 and Chapter 9, Part H of the JLM for a full discussion of the right to effective assistance of counsel.
104. Davidson v. Scully, 684 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that prison officials who did not allow a prisoner to mail sealed letters to the Army Board for Corrections of Military Records, the Commanding Officer, United States Army Reserve Components Personnel Center, the Judge Advocate General, and the American Civil Liberties Union violated prisoner’s right to meaningful access to the courts).
105. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 476 (5th Cir. 1976); Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78–79 (7th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing incoming from outgoing mail to the courts on this ground).
106. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2180, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606, 618 (1996) (holding the prisoner must prove his prison’s law library or legal assistance program was lacking in a way actually hindering his efforts to pursue a legal claim); Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding appointment of counsel to a prisoner was sufficient to satisfy the prisoner’s right of access to the courts; the attorney’s performance did not have to be “effective” as long as it did not prevent the prisoner from pursuing a particular legal claim); DeLeon v. Doe, 361 F.3d 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2004) (dismissing prisoner’s claim for denial of court access when prison officials caused delays to his legal mail); Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding interference with mail, if it reaches its intended destination, is insufficient to show actual injury); Taylor v. Coughlin, 29 F.3d 39, 40 (2d. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (holding prison’s failure to supply prisoners with adequate typewriters did not cause any injury; prisoners were able to access the courts through handwritten documents); Shango v. Jurich, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7597 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1988) (holding 111-days of the prison law library being closed in one year was insufficient to claim lack of meaningful access to courts); Richardson v. McDonnell, 841 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the loss of outgoing court documents was not a sufficient injury because the error was noted in time to allow the plaintiff to re-file the documents); Jermosen v. Coughlin, 877 F. Supp. 864, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the confiscation of a tape mailed to a prisoner did not qualify as a sufficient injury because the prisoner had access to the tape when preparing his civil action, and at the time the tape was taken, the prisoner’s case had already been settled). But see Key v. Artuz, No. 95 CV 0392 (HB), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13201, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1995) (unpublished) (holding that a prison’s mishandling of legal mail that resulted in the prisoner missing a court-imposed deadline was a sufficient showing of injury).
109. Smith v. O’Connor, 901 F. Supp. 644, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that although corrections officials destroyed a prisoner’s personal property, including his legal papers, the prisoner failed to show prejudice and thus failed to state a claim that he was denied access to the courts); Herrera v. Scully, 815 F. Supp. 713, 723–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that prison officials did not act in an “intentional and deliberate manner to deprive [the prisoner] of his constitutional rights by preventing his legal mail from arriving at court in a timely manner.”).
the purpose of denying him access to the courts. Many courts, however, do not require you to meet this additional requirement.110

3. Attorney-Client Privilege

For communications with your attorney, you have the additional shield of the attorney-client privilege.111 This privilege allows you to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing, confidential communications between your attorney and you. The protection that it provides is limited in two ways. First, because the privilege only protects you against disclosure of your legal correspondence, it may only be used to challenge the reading of your legal mail, not the inspection of it.112 However, even though prisons may declare temporary emergencies requiring them to open your mail, they may not continue to justify mail opening by stating that the emergency is indefinite.113 Second, there are exceptions to the kinds of communication that are protected by the privilege. For the attorney-client privilege to apply, you must intend for your communication to remain confidential.114 In other words, if you disclose information to someone other than your attorney, this information will no longer be considered privileged. Disclosure to representatives of the attorney, such as his or her secretary or student clerk, however, is considered the same as communication with the attorney and is covered under the privilege.115 An exception is that you cannot claim the attorney-client privilege if the communication furthers future wrongdoing.116 It does not matter if your communications with your lawyer are written or oral; both are equally privileged.117

4. Legal Correspondence and New York State and City Regulations

The following is a discussion of additional New York rules governing legal mail restrictions. Prisoners in other states must consult their state and local regulations. The New York Department of Correctional Services regulations state that incoming legal mail should be opened and examined only in the presence of the prisoner and will not be read by prison authorities without written superintendent authorization.118 Outgoing privileged mail may not be opened, inspected, or read without written superintendent authorization. The regulations applying to city and county jails in New York have essentially the same

110. See, e.g., Key v. Artuz, No. 95 CV 0392 (HB), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13201, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1995) (unpublished) (denying defendant motion to dismiss where interference caused prisoner to miss court-imposed deadline, the Court stated that the plaintiff's failure to allege invidious (malicious) intent did not fall short of the pleading standards due to the Court's liberal reading of the complaint as if alleging this element).

111. Statute generally sets forth this privilege. In New York, the relevant statute can be found at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503.1 (McKinney 2007).

112. Frye v. Henderson, 474 F.2d 1263, 1264 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (stating opening mail to check for contraband is legitimate); People v. Poe, 193 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 481, 145 Cal. App. 3d 574, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2985, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 963 (1974)). Some courts have even held prison officials can open mail from a court outside your presence, since court documents are public records and therefore not subject to the same protections. See Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78–79 (7th Cir. 1987) (incoming court mail is not privileged and does not involve the same concerns about retaliation for filing a lawsuit as outgoing mail from a prisoner to a judge); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding incoming mail from a court not “legal mail”).

113. See Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 362–63 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that though a risk of anthrax terrorism might have justified temporarily opening prisoner mail after September 11, 2001, there was no rational basis for continuing this policy more than three years later).

114. United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the fact that a meeting between a prisoner and his attorney “take[s] place away from public view is not enough to prove that the prisoner intended the communication between them to be confidential); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding that in the case of an attorney preparing a tax return, no privilege could be expected since the form is not intended to be confidential but “is given for transmittal by the attorney to others”); Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 68–69, 409 N.E.2d 983, 986, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (1980)(“[N]ot all communications to an attorney are privileged. In order to make a valid claim of privilege, it must be shown that the information sought to be protected from disclosure was a 'confidential communication' made to the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or services.”) (citing Matter of Jacqueline F., 47 N.Y.2d 215, 219, 391 N.E.2d 967, 969; 417 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886, (1979); People ex rel. Vogelstein v Warden of County Jail of County of N.Y., 150 Misc. 417, 717–18, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 366 (1934); 8 Wigmore § 2292).


provisions, except they additionally state that mailed communications with attorneys may not be read without a search warrant.\textsuperscript{119}

The standards applicable to jails in New York City have recently been changed and now distinguish between privileged and non-privileged mail. Your privileged incoming mail cannot be opened except in your presence or pursuant to a search warrant, and your privileged outgoing correspondence can only be opened or read pursuant to a search warrant.\textsuperscript{120}

5. Legal Correspondence and Federal Regulations

Privileged mail is referred to as “special mail” in the federal regulations governing the Federal Bureau of Prisons.\textsuperscript{121} This includes mail from state and federal courts, attorneys, the President and Vice-President, governors, members of the U.S. Congress, embassies and consulates, federal law enforcement officers, and the Department of Justice (excluding the Bureau of Prisons, but including U.S. Attorneys).\textsuperscript{122} Mail from any of these sources should be marked as follows on the envelope: “Special Mail—Open only in the presence of the inmate.”\textsuperscript{123} Prison authorities may still open these letters to ensure there is no contraband and to confirm the enclosed letter does in fact qualify as special mail. But, they may not read the letter. If the envelope is not marked as special mail, the correspondence will be treated as general correspondence.\textsuperscript{124}

Mail from attorneys must be marked as described above and must indicate the attorney’s name and the fact that he or she is an attorney. While the word “Attorney” does not need to appear on the envelope, the court states that there must be some indication that the person sending the letter is an attorney. This indication does not have to be placed on any particular place on the envelope.\textsuperscript{125} For more information, see the relevant federal regulations.\textsuperscript{126}

As a practical matter, whether you are a state or federal prisoner, you should clearly label envelopes of privileged correspondence: “Privileged Correspondence (Special Mail)—Do Not Open Except in the Presence of Intended Inmate-Recipient.” You may also want to suggest your lawyer tape shut all mail sent to you. This will let you know whether your mail had been opened and read when you were not present, since you would be able to see where the tape was removed from the envelope.

D. Internet Communication

The right of a prisoner to access the Internet, whether directly or indirectly, is a relatively new subject, since the Internet has only recently become common in day-to-day life. Therefore, there are not many cases testing the rights of prisoners to communicate through the Internet. However, the Turner standard clearly applies to cases involving Internet communication.\textsuperscript{127}

Most, if not all, states ban prisoners from direct, unsupervised access to the Internet.\textsuperscript{128} Federal legislation prevents prisoners from access without official supervision.\textsuperscript{129} Though this statute has not yet been tested in court, it will likely be upheld because it is narrowly tailored (does not ban access, just requires supervision) to a valid prison interest (security). Some states allow certain prisoners to access the Internet under supervision for educational and professional courses.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{119} N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 7004.4 (2007). Note that this section of the regulations distinguishes legal privileged correspondence from general privileged correspondence.


\textsuperscript{121} 28 C.F.R. § 540.2(c) (2007).

\textsuperscript{122} 28 C.F.R. § 540.12(b) (2007).

\textsuperscript{123} 28 C.F.R. § 540.12(b) (2007).

\textsuperscript{124} 28 C.F.R. § 540.18(b) (2007).

\textsuperscript{125} Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307, 313–14 (6th Cir. 2009).

\textsuperscript{126} 28 C.F.R. § 540.2(c) (2007).

\textsuperscript{127} See Part A of this Chapter for an explanation of the Turner standard.


\textsuperscript{129} Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Title VIII, sec. 801, Pub. L. No. 105-314, 112 Stat. 2974, 2990 (1998) (withholding federal funding from any federal program that allows prisoners unsupervised access to the Internet). This statute was enacted in response to a specific case in which a prisoner who had been granted access to participate in online classes instead used his unsupervised time to download child pornography.

\textsuperscript{130} See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5145.31C(1) (a).
program called The Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS). This system lets prisoners send electronic messages to families and attorneys without actually using the Internet.\textsuperscript{131} You should look into the regulations of your own state to find out its specific rules.

Prisoners commonly access the Internet indirectly by using third parties for assistance. For instance, a prisoner might write a regular letter to a third party describing the information he wants posted on the Internet or that he wants sent in an email. The third party would then post the information online or send the email, and afterwards would print any Internet response and mail it to the prisoner.\textsuperscript{132} Some states have begun to pass laws against this type of indirect Internet communication. For instance, Ohio prevents any access, direct or indirect, except for access related to educational programs.\textsuperscript{133} Arizona has a similar statute that eliminates prisoners’ direct and indirect access to the internet and email.\textsuperscript{134} Other statutes of this kind have also been enacted in Minnesota, California, Kansas, and Wisconsin.\textsuperscript{135} These statutes have only begun to be tested in the courts, and most of the recent litigation in this area has centered on these state legislative schemes. The reaction in various courts has been mixed.

In 2004, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a California policy prohibiting prisoners from receiving by mail any material downloaded from the Internet.\textsuperscript{136} Applying the \textit{Turner} standard, the court found no logical relationship between the regulation and the legitimate concerns of security and of increased workload for the mailroom.\textsuperscript{137} On the other hand, a 2008 California case reaffirmed that prisoners may be denied direct Internet access, stating that there is no free-standing First Amendment right to computer and Internet access.\textsuperscript{138}

The response at the district court level has been similarly mixed. A judge in Arizona found the state law to be unconstitutional,\textsuperscript{139} while a judge in Kansas upheld a similar law.\textsuperscript{140} Much seems to turn on the courts’ interpretation of the \textit{Turner} factors in this context.\textsuperscript{141} The Ninth circuit case and the Arizona district court case indicate that the policies prohibiting indirect access to the Internet through the receipt of Internet-generated materials in the mail might be more likely to be struck down than policies dealing with direct Internet access. However, it is important to note there have not yet been enough cases on this matter to determine exactly how various courts will handle the issue of Internet communication.

\section*{E. Receipt and Possession of Publications}

The same standards that govern censorship of incoming mail apply to your right to receive and possess books, magazines, and other reading material. Before 1989, \textit{Procunier v. Martinez}\textsuperscript{142} held that a publication could not be prohibited unless prison officials could show that the particular publication was a threat to prison security or order or would negatively affect a prisoner’s rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{143}

But, in 1989, in \textit{Thornburgh v. Abbott}, the U.S. Supreme Court replaced the \textit{Martinez} standard with a standard easier for prison officials to meet: the \textit{Turner} standard.\textsuperscript{144} Lower federal and state court decisions that invalidated restrictions under the \textit{Martinez} standard almost surely do not reflect current law, so you probably cannot cite to them in any court papers. \textit{This means that you cannot rely on cases decided before 1989}. See the discussion of \textit{Martinez} and \textit{Abbott} in Part B of this Chapter.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} At least one court has held prisoners cannot be punished if third parties post information on the Internet for them. \textit{See} Canadian Coalition against the Death Penalty v. Ryan, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1201, 1203 (D. Ariz. 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{133} Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5145.31C(1) (a).
\item \textsuperscript{136} Clement v. Cal. Dept. of Corr., 364 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2004).
\item \textsuperscript{137} Clement v. Cal. Dept. of Corr., 364 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2004).
\item \textsuperscript{139} Canadian Coalition Against the Death Penalty v. Ryan, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1203 (D. Ariz. 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{140} Waterman v. Commandant, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1242 (D. Kan. 2004).
\item \textsuperscript{142} Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974).
\item \textsuperscript{143} Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1811, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224, 240 (1974).
\item \textsuperscript{144} Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1989).
\end{itemize}
6. General Standards for Receiving Publications

You have a First Amendment right to receive publications, and a publisher has a First Amendment right to send you publications. But, restrictions of this right are valid if reasonably related to a legitimate prison interest (the Turner standard).\textsuperscript{145} The Supreme Court has noted deference should be paid to the “informed discretion of correction officials.”\textsuperscript{146} This means it will be relatively easy for officials to restrict access to publications, but censorship is not allowed just because the publication’s content is unpopular or offensive.\textsuperscript{147}

Most courts, applying the Turner standard, have upheld restrictions on receiving incoming publications. Generally, they have held such restrictions are rationally related to the legitimate governmental interests of security,\textsuperscript{148} screening contraband,\textsuperscript{149} preventing fire,\textsuperscript{150} and promoting rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{151} In Frost v. Symington, a federal appeals court upheld regulations withholding sexually explicit magazines from prisoners.\textsuperscript{152} In Malik v. Coughlin,\textsuperscript{153} a New York state court, citing Abbott, allowed censorship of an incoming article in which the author made critical and exaggerated allegations concerning prison medical personnel. The censored article alleged correctional facilities used prisoners as guinea pigs for drug testing.\textsuperscript{154} The court held the censorship did not violate the prisoner's right to free speech, despite the fact that the article was read at two other prisons without any disruptions.\textsuperscript{155} The withholding of publications that contain racist statements has also been upheld by federal courts relying on Abbott.\textsuperscript{156} Prison officials can probably ban the distribution of an internal prisoners' newsletter as contrary to prison security if it contains similar forbidden content. However, as one court held in Epps v. Smith,\textsuperscript{157} a prison cannot ban distribution of an outside newsletter that does not contain prohibited content (in this case, a self-described "revolutionary prisoners' newspaper" published in California and distributed in a New York penitentiary). The court there relied heavily on the rights of those outside the prison to air their political views.\textsuperscript{158}

Occasionally, courts will strike down restrictions on publications because they have no rational relationship to the asserted government interest. In Crofton v. Roe,\textsuperscript{159} the court found a regulation that only allowed a prisoner to receive publications he ordered and paid for directly bore no relationship to the interest

\textsuperscript{148} See, e.g., Malik v. Coughlin, 154 A.D.2d 135, 137–38, 552 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (3d Dept. 1990) (holding that the accusations contained in the publication would have incited disobedience).
\textsuperscript{149} See, e.g., Skelton v. Pri-Cor, 963 F.2d 100, 103 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that because hardback books can be used to smuggle contraband, a ban on such books was valid). But see Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no rational relation between preventing contraband and ban bulk mailings and catalogs).
\textsuperscript{150} See, e.g., Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 902 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that reducing fire hazards is a legitimate government interest but banning bulk mailings does not rationally serve that interest). Cf. Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that banning catalogs and bulk mailings is not rationally related to decreasing the risk of fire, since limitations already exist on the number of possessions in prisoners’ cells).
\textsuperscript{151} See, e.g., Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 217–18 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a state statute prohibiting pornographic materials for prisoners had a rational relationship to rehabilitation): Dawson v. Scurr, 986 F.2d 257, 260 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that there was a rational relationship between prohibiting psychologically unfit prisoners from seeing sexually explicit materials and the legitimate goal of rehabilitation).
\textsuperscript{152} Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 357–58 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that regulation of pornographic materials promotes security interests).
\textsuperscript{156} See, e.g., Thomas v. U.S. Sec’y of Def., 730 F. Supp. 362, 364–65 (D. Kan. 1990) (holding that restriction of materials that could cause racial confrontations was valid); Chriseol v. Phillips, 169 F.3d 313, 315–17 (5th Cir. 1999)(holding that restriction of materials that advocated racial, religious, or national hatred that could cause violence was valid); Winburn v. Bologna, 979 F. Supp. 531, 534–35 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that restriction of mail that promoted racial supremacy was valid).
\textsuperscript{159} Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999).
of screening for contraband. In Spellman v. Hopper,\textsuperscript{160} the court found no rational relationship between the government interests of security and fire prevention, and a restriction that prohibited prisoners in administrative segregation (as opposed to in disciplinary segregation) from receiving any subscriptions. Similarly, in Aiello v. Litscher,\textsuperscript{161} the court held a restriction on publications that contained any nudity could be invalidated as too broad because the restriction included scientific texts and works of art.\textsuperscript{162}

A common restriction imposed by prisons is the "publishers-only" rule, which permits "inmates to receive newspapers, magazines, and books from publishers or book clubs only."\textsuperscript{163} The Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish\textsuperscript{164} held that if your prison adopts a publishers-only rule for hardcover books, you have no right to receive publications directly from friends or family, as the rule might be necessary to ensure prison security by preventing contraband smuggling. Bell only dealt with hardcover books, so it is unclear how far its reasoning can extend. Lower courts have extended the publishers-only rule to other publications like magazines and soft-cover books because courts accept the argument by prison officials that requiring prisoners to receive such materials directly from the publisher is a minor inconvenience, compared to the greater inconvenience of searching all materials not sent in factory-sealed packages.\textsuperscript{165} But, courts have found that some restrictions on your ability to receive publications are not rational and have struck them down. For example, one circuit court has stated that prisons may not require books ordered from approved vendors to have special shipping labels.\textsuperscript{166} Also, some courts have held that prisons cannot place certain restrictions on bulk mail.\textsuperscript{167} In a recent California case, a federal court held that a policy of prohibiting a vendor from sending free, softbound, religious materials to prisoners was not rational.\textsuperscript{168} Finally, banning gift subscriptions may not be rational.\textsuperscript{169}

In addition, bans on certain publications, beyond sexually explicit ones, can be found reasonably related to rehabilitation interests. In Beard v. Banks, the Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania regulation denying all newspapers and magazines to prisoners held in segregation and temporarily classified as particularly dangerous or unmanageable.\textsuperscript{170} Applying the Turner test, the Court found that such a restriction was reasonably related to the prison's interest in promoting good behavior.\textsuperscript{171} It was important in this case that the prisoners' placement in segregation was not permanent, and that they could earn back their privilege to possess publications.\textsuperscript{172} One of the Supreme Court justices, Justice Stevens, dissented (disagreed with the outcome) because he thought that the rationale of rehabilitation was too broad and could theoretically justify taking away any right or privilege in prison.\textsuperscript{173} As this case is relatively recent, it is important to note that there is some disagreement on the issue, even within the Supreme Court.

\textsuperscript{160} Spellman v. Hopper, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1282 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (distinguishing from cases upholding subscription bans for prisoners in disciplinary segregation, since their lack of access to publications could provide a disincentive to commit infractions).

\textsuperscript{161} Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1082 (W.D. Wis. 2000).

\textsuperscript{162} But see Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1060 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding a restriction on sexually explicit materials, even if it includes art and science texts, as not unconstitutionally overbroad).


\textsuperscript{165} See Avery v. Powell, 806 F. Supp. 7, 8–11 (D.N.H. 1992) (finding a prison regulation prohibiting prisoners from receiving blank greeting cards, unless sent from a vendor, was reasonably related to a legitimate interest in maintaining prison security, as greeting cards received from non-vendors would necessitate time-consuming searches for contraband).

\textsuperscript{166} Ashker v. Cal. Dept. of Corr., 350 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2003).

\textsuperscript{167} Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding prison cannot ban prisoners from receiving subscriptions sent by bulk, third, or fourth class mail): Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692,700–01 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding prison may not prohibit subscriptions from receiving non-subscription bulk mail and catalogs).


\textsuperscript{171} Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 533, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2580, 165 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707 (2006) (“[W]ithholding such privileges ‘is a proper and even necessary management technique to induce compliance with the rules of inmate behavior, especially for high-security prisoners who have few other privileges to lose.’”) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 2168–69, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162, 171 (2003))).


You cannot be punished for having literature that is prohibited if the literature is prohibited by an unconstitutional or illegal rule. If you are punished for having this literature, Chapter 18 of the JLM, “Your Rights at Prison Disciplinary Proceedings,” should help you understand your rights during prison disciplinary proceedings.

Finally, you should remember that state law, and state and federal regulations, might give you additional protections regarding access to literature. For instance, federal regulations allow prisoners in minimum and low-security facilities to receive soft-cover books from any source, though they can receive hardcover books only from the publisher, a book club, or a bookstore. Prisoners in medium or high-security facilities must receive all books from the publisher, a book club, or a bookstore. In addition, facility administrators have the ability to reject publications if they contain content, like depictions of violence and sexually explicit material (discussed in more detail below), that would be a security risk. So, you should research additional regulations or laws that might apply to you.

1. Receiving Sexually Explicit Materials

Some regulations specifically prohibit sexually explicit materials. Courts have upheld such regulations based on two different government interests: (1) promoting rehabilitation, and (2) protecting prison security. In Ballance v. Virginia, the court upheld the confiscation of photographs of partially nude children from a convicted pedophile, reasoning that “due ... to the prison's interest in rehabilitating this disease,” prison officials acted reasonably in confiscating the photographs. Similarly, in Dawson v. Scurr, the court held that restrictions on sexually explicit materials were justified for psychologically unfit prisoners because exposure to such materials would interfere with their rehabilitation.

The Thornburgh v. Abbott rule gives prison officials discretion to ban sexually explicit material if officials reasonably believe the material poses a threat to prison order. Prison officials are given this discretion because allowing a prisoner to possess such material may lead other prisoners to make assumptions about that prisoner’s beliefs, sexual orientation, or gang affiliations, and encourage violence. At least one federal circuit court has held that a ban on sexually explicit material is reasonable in order to prevent sexual harassment of female staff. But, some courts have struck down blanket bans on sexually explicit material and instead require the prison to show that giving a specific publication to prisoners will harm their rehabilitation.

Even if the prison decides to ban sexually explicit materials, some courts have held that both the prisoner and the publisher are entitled to notice of the ban and an opportunity to respond. The reason for granting notice to publishers is that they have a First Amendment right to communicate with individual

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175. 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(a) (2007).
176. For an explanation of content that can amount to a security risk, see 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (2007).
182. See Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 129 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that “the connection between the [restrictive statute] and the government's rehabilitative interest” is not “obvious upon consideration of the entire federal inmate population, including those prisoners not incarcerated for sex-related crimes”); Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 762 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Before delivery of a publication may be refused, prison administrators must review the particular issue of the publication in question and make a specific, factual determination that the publication is detrimental to prisoner rehabilitation because it would encourage deviate, criminal sexual behavior.”).
183. Montcalm Pub'g Corp. v. Beck, 80 F.3d 105, 106 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that “publishers are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard when their publications are disapproved for receipt by inmate-subscribers”); Jacklovich v. Simmon, 392 F.3d 420, 433 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that publishers as well as prisoners have a right to be notified when inmate subscribers are prohibited from receiving the publishers' publications). Note that the 10th Circuit later clarified that Jacklovich governed only intentional rejections of the publications, rather than accidents such as a mistake in the mailroom. Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007).
prisoners if they so choose. Additionally, at least one court has held that prisoners have a right to appeal
censorship decisions to someone other than the official who ordered the censorship.

In *Thornburgh v. Abbott*, one of the regulations at issue allowed the warden to ban homosexually explicit
material depicting the same gender as the prison population. The Supreme Court held the rule was valid.
In doing so, the Court upheld the regulation allowing the warden to permit heterosexual material and reject
homosexual material. The regulation also directed non-explicit homosexual material to be permitted. The Court reasoned, “[P]risoners may observe particular material in the possession of a fellow prisoner, draw
inferences about their fellow [prisoner]’s . . . sexual orientation . . . and cause disorder by acting accordingly . . . [I]t is essential that prison officials be given broad discretion to prevent such disorder.”

“Disorder” presumably means sexual or violent assault. The Court did not explain why explicitly
homosexual material would cause disorder or violence. Others have offered at least two theories: identification and cueing. The identification theory holds that possession of explicit homosexual material will identify that prisoner as gay and make that prisoner a target for assault. The cueing theory reasons that dissemination of such material in prison will “lead inmates to believe that homosexual activity is condoned there.”

What this means for the prisoner wishing to receive sexually explicit homosexual material is unclear
because the discretion given to officials in *Thornburgh v. Abbott* may result in many different decisions and regulations. At least one court has stated in *dicta* (language not critical to the case’s holding and therefore
not binding on later courts) that because exposure of one’s sexual identity in a maximum-security prison is
more likely to lead to assault by others than in a minimum-security facility, prison security concerns are
more legitimate in a maximum-security facility. Such reasoning could mean that incoming sexually explicit homosexual material may be denied at maximum-security, but not minimum-security, facilities.

As a general rule, gay and lesbian prisoners may seek to obtain non-sexually explicit homosexual
material through the mail. Federal regulations seem to allow the wholesale admission of these materials

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184. Montcalm Publ’g Corp. v. Beck, 80 F.3d 105, 109 (4th Cir. 1996).
186. The Program Statement No. 5266.5, which added to the regulation at issue, 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b)(7) (2007),
allowed the warden to reject the following types of sexually explicit material: (1) homosexual (of the same sex as the
prison population), (2) sado-masochistic, (3) bestial, or (4) involving children. *Thornburgh v. Abbott*, 490 U.S. 401, 405
n.6, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1877 n.6, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459, 468 n.6 (1989).
(citing Program Statement supplementing 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b)(7) (2007)).
(emphasis added).
ed., 2010).
ed., 2010).
(noting that “the exercise of discretion called for by these regulations may produce seeming ‘inconsistencies,’” but that
this does not necessarily mean “arbitrary or irrationality”). Compare *Inosencio v. Johnson*, 547 F. Supp. 130, 135–36
homosexual worship service to be constitutional based on the reasoning that prisoners attending such services would be
exposing themselves to attacks from other prisoners), with *Lipp v. Procunier*, 395 F. Supp. 871, 877–78 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(holding the prohibition of homosexual worship services to be a possible violation of prisoners’ 1st Amendment right to
religious freedom and requiring prison officials to present findings of fact that clearly supported their assertion that such
a service would present a danger to the prison population). The Second Circuit has not considered the issue of sexually
explicit homosexual materials in prisons, but it has upheld a regulation banning prisoners from keeping sexually explicit
photos of their wives and girlfriends on the grounds that such photos may create violence among prisoners due to their
personal nature. *Giano v. Senkowski*, 54 F.3d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1995). See also *Thomas v. Scully*, No. 89 Civ. 4715,
court would extend these holdings to sexually explicit photos of gay partners as well.
408 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing testimony by the director of the California Department of Corrections that the Department
could make a good case for denying prisoners the ability to attend homosexual church service in a maximum-security
prison while allowing those in a medium-security facility to attend). See also C.F.R. § 540.71(b)(7) (2007).
into the federal prison environment.\textsuperscript{193} State prisoners who desire such material, however, may encounter the same arguments used by prison officials to ban sexually explicit homosexual materials. For instance, one court applied an identification theory in \textit{Harper v. Wallingford}\textsuperscript{194} to find that a prisoner’s First Amendment rights were not violated when non-explicit mail promoting consensual sexual relationships between adult men and juvenile males was withheld from him. The court found legitimate the prison officials’ concern that the material, when seen by other prisoners, would make the prisoner a target as a homosexual and would thus make him vulnerable to assault. However, such arguments might fail to persuade courts if it is clear that the prisoner is already known to be gay. This is because one of the main arguments used by prison officials is identification.\textsuperscript{195} For more information on gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender issues, see \textit{JLM}, Chapter 30.

Courts have also upheld restrictions on explicit heterosexual materials,\textsuperscript{196} including sexually explicit photographs of prisoners’ wives or girlfriends.\textsuperscript{197} While these restrictions are almost always found to be constitutional, a few courts have scrutinized such regulations much more closely. In \textit{Aiello v. Litscher},\textsuperscript{198} the court held that a regulation banning all written or visual materials containing nudity or sexual behavior was too vague because it would also ban important works of art and literature. It noted that a jury could find that the prohibition of such works is not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. It also concluded that there was no evidence that such materials threaten security or rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{199}

\section*{F. Access to the News Media}

You may want to publicize your case by attracting the media’s attention. The Supreme Court has held that a reasonable and effective means of communication between prisoners and the media must exist.\textsuperscript{200} But, prisons have a legitimate security interest in limiting access to outside visitors, including the press.\textsuperscript{201} The court held that limiting or prohibiting face-to-face interviews with the press does not violate the First Amendment as long as prisoners can still communicate with the press through writing or those allowed to visit.\textsuperscript{202} In \textit{Houchins v. KQED}, the Supreme Court repeated that freedom of the press does not grant the media special access to prisons.\textsuperscript{203} As such, physical access by the news media (through visitation, tours, photographs, etc.) can be restricted just as physical access by the public based on security interests can. In a

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{193} See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1877, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459, 467 (1989) (noting that publications must be “detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or facilitate criminal activity” before their access can be restricted).
\bibitem{194} Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1989).
\bibitem{195} See Espinoza v. Wilson, 814 F.2d 1093, 1098–99 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding that protecting the sexual identity of the prisoners was not a valid reason for restricting access to homosexual publications since the prisoners were already open about being gay but finding in favor of the warden because he stated other legitimate reasons for restricting access).
\bibitem{196} Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding restrictions on explicit heterosexual materials as reasonably related to the goal of preventing sexual harassment of female prison guards).
\bibitem{197} Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the regulation was rationally related to the prevention of prisoner violence; the court pointed out that other avenues are available for reinforcing emotional bonds, such as non-nude photographs or romantic letters, and for satisfying the right to graphic sexual imagery, such as commercially produced erotica or sexually graphic letters).
\bibitem{198} Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
\bibitem{199} Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1079–81 (W.D. Wis. 2000). \textit{See also} Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2005) (following \textit{Aiello} in finding that a definition of “pornography” agreed to in a settlement by the parties could not be contested as overly broad).
\bibitem{201} Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2806, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495, 503–04 (1974): \textit{see also} Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850, 94 S. Ct. 2811, 2815, 41 L. Ed. 2d 514, 519–20 (1974) (\textit{Pell}’s companion case, finding that under the Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations, the media does not have the right to access prisoners and inmates beyond the rights granted to members of the general public. \textit{Saxbe} differs from \textit{Pell} in that \textit{Saxbe} only looks at the rights of the inmates, while \textit{Pell} also addresses the rights of prisoners to communicate with the media).
\bibitem{203} Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2588, 57 L. Ed. 2d 553 (1978).
\end{thebibliography}
recent case, a court noted that these kinds of restrictions can vary depending on the security of a particular prison or unit.\textsuperscript{204}

Federal regulations governing prisoners held by the Federal Bureau of Prisons provide that correspondence sent to the media be treated as if it were privileged\textsuperscript{205} and is considered special mail.\textsuperscript{206} The rules discussed in Part C of this Chapter for privileged correspondence therefore apply to letters to the media for those prisoners. Correspondence from the media is subject to inspections for contraband, qualification as media correspondence, and content likely to promote either illegal activity or conduct contrary to Bureau regulations.\textsuperscript{207} But a prisoner may not receive pay for any correspondence with the media, act as a reporter, or publish under a byline.\textsuperscript{208} This restriction on publishing under a byline was recently successfully challenged in a federal district court in \textit{Jordan v. Pugh},\textsuperscript{209} The court found the absolute restriction was too broad for the stated interest of maintaining prison security, especially considering prisoners were allowed other publishing opportunities.\textsuperscript{210} As this is a recent development, you should watch to see if other courts agree.

The warden of a federal prison has a duty to provide information to the media about certain events that take place in the prison. These include deaths, inside escapes, and institutional emergencies.\textsuperscript{211} The warden must also provide basic information about a prisoner that is a matter of public record if it is requested by the media, unless the information is confidential.\textsuperscript{212}

\section*{G. Visitation}

Convicted prisoners’ constitutional rights to visitation may be severely restricted, although pretrial detainees are almost certainly allowed reasonable visitation rights,\textsuperscript{213} since lack of access to visitors like attorneys can infringe the right to due process and counsel.\textsuperscript{214} In \textit{Overton v. Bazzetta}, the Supreme Court did not state the scope of a prisoner’s constitutional right to freedom of association, instead finding that a regulation restricting visits was reasonably related to the penological interest of security and therefore not a violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights.\textsuperscript{215} Regardless of the type of prisoner, visitation rights may be restricted for considerations of institutional administration, security, and rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{216} Prison officials may regulate the time, place, and manner of visits,\textsuperscript{217} though such regulations, at least regarding pretrial

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item 204. Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F. 3d, 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2009) (upholding a ban on person to person meetings between the media and prisoners in the Special Confinement Unit, which contains most federal death penalty prisoners), \textit{cert. denied}, 130 S. Ct. 1735, 176 L. Ed. 2d 212 (2010).
\item 205. 28 C.F.R. § 540.20(a) (2007).
\item 206. 28 C.F.R. § 540.2c (2007).
\item 207. 28 C.F.R. § 540.20(c) (2007).
\item 208. 28 C.F.R. § 540.20(b) (2007).
\item 210. \textit{Jordan v. Pugh}, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1124–26 (D. Colo. 2007) (reaching the same outcome under both the \textit{Turner} and \textit{Martinez} standards).
\item 211. 28 C.F.R. § 540.65(a) (2007).
\item 212. 28 C.F.R. § 540.65(b) (2007).
\item 214. \textit{See Procunier v. Martinez}, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1814, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224, 243 (1974) (“[I]nmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys. Regulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts are invalid.”).
\item 215. \textit{Overton v. Bazzetta}, 539 U.S. 126, 131–32, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 2167, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162, 170 (2003) (“We need not attempt to explore or define the asserted right of association at any length or determine the extent to which it survives incarceration because the challenged regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests. This suffices to sustain the regulation in question.”).
\item 217. \textit{See Martin v. Tyson}, 845 F.2d 1451, 1455–56 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that legitimate safety concerns and
detainees, must be reasonable.\textsuperscript{218} Prison officials may also restrict some of the rights of visitors.\textsuperscript{219} The \textit{Turner} reasonableness standard also applies to visitation, so courts can invalidate unreasonable restrictions.\textsuperscript{220} Contact visits are not constitutionally required for pretrial detainees or for prisoners.\textsuperscript{221}

Prison officials have broad discretion in decisions about who may visit, since the matter may be of legitimate security concern. It is up to the prison official to produce evidence that visitation restriction was in response to a security concern. It is then the prisoner’s burden to show by substantial evidence that the prison officials’ response was exaggerated and unjustified. There are various types of visitation restrictions that are allowable because they further security interests.\textsuperscript{222} In \textit{Overton}, for instance, the Supreme Court upheld a regulation requiring an approved visitor list as reasonably related to security interests.\textsuperscript{223}

Courts have also upheld rules restricting visits to those who have a personal or professional relationship with the prisoner. Courts have also upheld rules denying visits by ex-convicts\textsuperscript{224} and parties suspected of smuggling contraband.\textsuperscript{225} The Supreme Court upheld similar regulations in \textit{Overton}.\textsuperscript{226} The Seventh Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals recently denied the constitutional claims of a prisoner whose niece and daughter had been removed from his visitor list.\textsuperscript{227} The court held that this was reasonable because the prisoner had previously been convicted of violent sex offenses and admitted to raping two children. Based on the holdings in \textit{Overton} and \textit{Turner}, the Seventh Circuit stated that a prison policy that restricts a prisoner’s constitutional rights is valid if it is rationally related to legitimate interests. The analysis of whether the restriction meets this standard requires the court to consider four issues: (1) whether a rational relationship exists between the policy and the interest it purports to advance; (2) whether there are other ways to exercise the right in question; (3) the impact that accommodating the right will have on prison resources; and, (4) whether there are alternatives to the policy.\textsuperscript{228} A 2009 New York case held that the Commissioner of Correctional Services had a rational basis for denying the prisoner’s request to participate in a family reunion program. The court emphasized that this decision is highly discretionary and will be upheld as long as there is a rational basis.\textsuperscript{229} The Commissioner in this case considered the appropriate factors, including the prisoner’s disciplinary record and participation in counseling sessions. The Commissioner ultimately

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\item \textsuperscript{218} See Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1458 (7th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (upholding policy limiting pre-trial detainee’s telephone access to every other day).
\item \textsuperscript{219} See Gray v. Bruce, 26 Fed. Appx. 819, 823–24 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that subjecting a prisoner’s wife to an “ion spectrometer test,” which tests for the presence of illegal drugs, was not necessarily a violation of her 4th Amendment privacy rights. However, the court ultimately held that she had stated enough facts to show that the particular search method applied to her could be unconstitutional because of its unreliability and could violate her Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination).
\item \textsuperscript{221} See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 3234, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438, 449 (1984) (holding contact visits are a privilege, not a right and that visits can be denied due to security concerns).
\item \textsuperscript{222} See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826–28, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2806–07, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495, 503–05 (1974) (holding that placing certain restrictions on visitations may further significant governmental interests and is therefore permitted).
\item \textsuperscript{223} Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 129, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 2166 156 L. Ed. 2d 162, 168 (2003).
\item \textsuperscript{224} See Farmer v. Loving, 392 F. Supp. 27, 31 (W.D. Va. 1975) (allowing ban on visitation by ex-prisoners).
\item \textsuperscript{225} See Robinson v. Palmer, 841 F.2d 1151, 1156–57 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding a ban on visits by prisoner’s wife, who was caught smuggling marijuana into prison, was justified by prison’s interest in preventing drug smuggling and because prisoner had other ways to communicate with his wife): Thorne v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270, 1275 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding a ban on visits from prisoner’s mother, who was suspected of smuggling drugs and refused to submit to a strip search, was justified by security interests): Rowland v. Wolff, 336 F. Supp. 257, 260 (Neb. 1971) (holding the interest of the state in preventing the introduction of lethal weapons outweighs a prisoner’s interest in being visited by his sisters).
\item \textsuperscript{226} Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133–34, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 2168, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162, 171 (2003).
\item \textsuperscript{227} Stojanovic v. Humphreys, 309 Fed. Appx. 48 (7th Cir. 2009).
\item \textsuperscript{228} Stojanovic v. Humphreys, 309 Fed. Appx. 48, 52 (7th Cir. 2009). (held that not all prongs must be addressed for the restriction to be valid if the other factors speak overwhelmingly in favor of the restriction).
\item \textsuperscript{229} Philips v. Commissioner of Correctional Services, 885 N.Y.S.2d 138, 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). See also Cabassa v. Goord, 836 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (decision to deny an inmate convicted of sexually assaulting four teenage girls, three of them at gunpoint, from participating in a family reunion program was supported by rational basis and his involuntary protective custody status and the associated security concern).
based his decision on the brutal nature of the prisoner’s crimes, and the court found this decision completely rational.  

Visits by immediate family will generally receive greater protection. Nevertheless, protection of children plays an important role in cases involving the intersection of visitation restrictions and parental rights. The primary consideration in such cases is the best interests of the children involved, and, at least in New York, Family Court is given broad discretion in making these decisions. In one 2001 New York case, the court found that an incarcerated father’s petition for visitation with his daughters was properly denied based on the children’s best interests. The court said that while the mere fact of incarceration is not alone sufficient to deny visitation, the court has discretion to study the record and make a decision based on all of the facts. In this case, the incarcerated father had almost no contact with his children in the five years he had been incarcerated. The children would have to travel many hours with a paternal grandmother they barely knew in order to visit, and the children themselves did not express any interest in seeing their father.  

Regulations restricting the visits of minor children who are not closely related to the prisoner are routinely upheld as reasonably related to interests both in prison security and in protecting the children. In one case, the court upheld the prison’s decision to deny visitation by the three-month-old niece of a prisoner who had been convicted of sexual assault. The prisoner had argued that this restriction violated his familial association rights, and that the decision to deny visitation was irrational and unreasonable. However, the court found that the restriction bore a connection to the prison’s legitimate interests in safety and rehabilitation. The prison’s decision was based on a recommendation by the prisoner’s social worker that the prisoner not see female minors because of his past conduct of sexual assaults and failure to receive sexual offender treatment.  

In addition to safety interests, rehabilitation interests can also justify visitation restrictions. In such cases, the restrictions usually take away visitation privileges from prisoners who have broken institutional rules. In Overton, the Supreme Court found that a Michigan regulation that prevented prisoners with two substance abuse disciplinary violations from receiving visitors (except legal and religious) was reasonably related to prison interests in rehabilitation. However, it was important in this case that the visitation ban was not permanent, since visitation could be reinstated for good behavior. It was also important that the prisoners had other ways to communicate with the persons who were denied visitation. A federal court in New York similarly held a prisoner’s suspension from the Family Reunion Program did not violate the Constitution, since contact visitation is a privilege, not a right. If the regulation in your case differs from these regulations (for example, if it is permanent), you may be able to challenge it in court. But be careful of filing a claim that might be dismissed as frivolous (having no legal merit), since it would become a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). JLM, Chapter 14 has more information on the PLRA. In one New York case, the court questioned the legitimacy of the prison’s decision to take away a prisoner’s right to contact visits. The decision was in response to a failed urine drug test, and the court questioned whether there was a connection to any safety or security concerns. The court concluded that the restriction was arbitrary and capricious and therefore a due process violation.  

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240. See Giano v. Goord, 9 F. Supp. 2d 235, 241 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that prisoner has no right to visitation even if removal from the program was based on a faulty urine test).  
Gay and lesbian prisoners who want visitation from their partners should note the case Doe v. Sparks.\textsuperscript{243} There, a lesbian prisoner challenged officials’ refusal to allow visits from her girlfriend. Prison rules only permitted visits between heterosexual prisoners and their opposite sex partners. The court found the visitation policy, supposedly established to meet security and disciplinary needs, had a rational relationship to those needs, but that other prison policies weakened this rational relationship.\textsuperscript{244} Thus, the court held the policy unconstitutional. In its opinion, the court found the connection between the prison policy and the asserted goals of security and discipline “so remote as to be arbitrary.”\textsuperscript{245} Whitmire v. Arizona\textsuperscript{246} is another helpful decision for gay and lesbian couples. In Whitmire v. Arizona, a gay couple had challenged an Arizona policy prohibiting same-sex kissing and hugging but allowing heterosexuals to embrace during visits. The lower court had dismissed the couple’s equal protection challenge, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision because the policy was not rationally related to prison safety.\textsuperscript{247}

Courts today are likely to be even more protective of the rights of same-sex couples. The Supreme Court has grown increasingly suspicious of classifications based on sexual orientation, even though the Court has not definitively decided whether to apply the highest level of scrutiny to such classifications.\textsuperscript{248} And, after Lawrence v. Texas,\textsuperscript{249} decided ten years after Sparks and one year after Whitmire, the Court would likely recognize a constitutional right of privacy to homosexual conduct protected under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{250}

One area in which the rights of same-sex couples is particularly relevant is conjugal visitation, or extended family visitation. Certain prisoners get visitation with their families for several days at a time at a private location on the prison campus. In June 2007, California became the first state to grant lesbian and gay prisoners in registered domestic partnerships the same rights to conjugal visits as married heterosexual couples.\textsuperscript{251} The extent of such rights provided in other states remains untested and uncertain.\textsuperscript{252} New York has instituted a Family Reunion Program in about one-third of its correctional facilities. The program allows prisoners to spend up to several days in privacy with their spouses, children, or parents. In January 2009, the Department of Correctional Services updated its “eligible relations” policy to include same-sex partners.

\textsuperscript{245} Whitmire v. Arizona, 298 F.3d 1134, (9th Cir. 2002).
\textsuperscript{246} Whitmire v. Arizona, 298 F.3d 1134, 1135–37 (9th Cir. 2002).
\textsuperscript{248} Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003) (holding that a Texas law that made it a crime for persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate conduct was unconstitutional because it violated the due process right to privacy).
\textsuperscript{251} In Connecticut, the extended family visitation program is available to spouses if their children are present. Since the Supreme Court of Connecticut held in 2008 that marriage could not be restricted to opposite-sex couples, it would appear that same-sex couples share an equal opportunity to participate in these programs, so long as their children or adopted children are present. See Kacy Elizabeth Wiggum, Defining Family in American Prisons, 30 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 357, 372 (2009). New Mexico is another state that has instituted extended family visitation programs, open to spouses and other nuclear family members, in several of its correctional facilities. Although New Mexico does not perform same-sex marriage and has rejected domestic partnership recognition for same-sex couples, the state does recognize same-sex marriages legally performed in other states or countries and has a non-discrimination law that extends to sexual orientation. Kacy Elizabeth Wiggum, Defining Family in American Prisons, 30 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 357, 375–77 (2009). Finally, in Washington State, the Department of Corrections allows an extended family visiting program for eligible inmates and members of their immediate family, defined as children, grandchildren, parents, siblings, or spouse. Washington State’s Domestic Partnership Law, which grants a number of rights to registered same-sex couples, together with the state’s anti-discrimination laws, may provide a legal foundation through which a court could compel the Department of Corrections to open the extended visitation program to registered same-sex couples. Kacy Elizabeth Wiggum, Defining Family in American Prisons, 30 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 357, 379–80 (2009).
validly married to a prisoner in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex marriage. At the same time, same-sex partners who are not married in this way and who have instead registered their relationship through New York's domestic partnership program are still excluded from participating in the Family Reunion Program. However, New York courts may be receptive to discrimination claims, because New York law explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and New York domestic partners have the same right to visitation as any spouse at hospitals, nursing homes, and other health care facilities.

Because Turner reasonableness governs visitation, the availability of other means of communicating with those who cannot visit is important. For instance, prisoners can still communicate with those restricted from visiting through telephone calls and letters. In addition, Turner says courts should consider the burden of accommodating rights, like security and personnel costs of allowing many visitors.

Keep in mind that federal, state, and local regulations may give you additional visitation rights that courts have not found constitutionally mandated. Prisoners in facilities run by the New York Department of Correctional Services should consult the Family Handbook for visitation restrictions. Most visitors do not need special permission, but the Superintendent must approve in advance writing visitors under parole or probation, with past or pending criminal histories, or who are also Department employees or volunteers. The Superintendent also has the power to deny visitation as necessary for security or other interests.

H. Using Telephones

While some courts have held prisoners have a First Amendment right to telephone access, some refuse to hold prisoners have such a right. Even courts recognizing a right to telephone access say the right can be severely limited. Turner reasonableness governs these restrictions on phone use. Courts point to prison

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257. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 2169, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162, 172 (2003) (finding prisoners have other means of communication and noting these alternatives need not be ideal, only available).
258. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 2169, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162, 172 (2003) (finding that accommodating visitation would have a significant negative impact on financial resources and visitor safety).
261. See Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming that prisoners have a First Amendment right to telephone access but holding that prisoners are not entitled to a specific rate for their telephone calls); see also Walton v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 18 Misc. 3d 775, 787, 849 N.Y.S.2d 395, 405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (on remand from New York Court of Appeals, upholding constitutional right to telephone access but dismissing claim that rates under a contract between the Department of Correctional Services and MCI, a telephone provider, violated families' and others' rights under the New York constitution). Many decisions involve pretrial detainees' phone access rights. See Johnson v. Galli, 596 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Nev. 1984) (holding that the First Amendment protects reasonable access to telephone communication for a pretrial detainee); Moore v. Janing, 427 F. Supp. 567, 576 (D. Neb. 1976) (affirming the unconstitutionality of institutional eavesdropping on the telephone calls of pretrial detainees but finding timing restrictions on telephone access reasonable); Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1051–52 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding a policy limiting pretrial detainees to one call to their lawyers every two weeks "patently inadequate" to secure assistance of counsel); Johnson v. Brejje, 701 F.2d 1201, 1207–08 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding limiting pretrial detainee to two 10-minute calls a week and no incoming calls violated his right to court access). Check if your state has enacted laws granting prisoners rights to phone access.
263. See, e.g., United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 110 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding the constitutionality of severe restrictions on a prisoner's telephone use where those restrictions were related to the state's interest in preventing him from ordering further crime from within the prison); Carter v. O'Sullivan, 924 F. Supp. 903, 909 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (holding
security as a valid reason under *Turner*. Courts also point to the fact that prisoners have only a limited need for telephones because they have other ways of communicating with the outside world, like letter-writing and visitation. In short, courts usually uphold restrictions on phone use unless the restrictions eliminate telephone access entirely or impede attorney representation.

These restrictions govern how much you have to pay to make a call, what types of calls you can make, whom you can call, and how many calls you can make. In *Johnson v. California*, the Ninth Circuit said prisoners were not entitled to a specific telephone rate and so it was valid to charge prisoners a higher rate than non-prisoners. In *Shoot v. Roop*, the Ninth Circuit also upheld a rule requiring all calls to be operator-assisted and collect (which means that prisoners there cannot call toll-free numbers). In *Washington v. Reno*, the Sixth Circuit upheld a regulation that allowed calls only to persons on an approved list. Courts have also upheld restrictions on the number of calls a prisoner can make.

Additionally, these restrictions govern your privacy during phone calls. Call monitoring does not violate prisoners’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights for two reasons. First, there is no reasonable expectation of

the computerized collect calling system employed by a prison, which blocked certain callers and prevented three-way calling, was a “reasonable restriction” on the constitutional right to telephone communication and finding “[m]onitoring of inmate telephone calls is acceptable because of legitimate concerns regarding prison security.”); Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that prisoners have a 1st Amendment right to telephone access but this right can be limited for the legitimate security interests of the prison and finding that denial of access to a telephone in the 30 minutes of imprisonment was not a violation of the prisoner’s rights).

264. See, e.g., United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 110–113 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying the *Turner* test to severe limitations on communication and finding the goal of prison security legitimate to justify restrictions); Gilday v. Dubois, 124 F.3d 277, 293–94 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding no right for a prisoner to use the telephone “on his own terms,” and holding that, because of reasonable prison security measures, it does not violate any constitutional right, or the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, to interfere with calls by prisoners to numbers not on a pre-approved list); Carter v. O’Sullivan, 924 F. Supp. 903, 909 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of a prison’s computerized collect calling system that blocked certain callers and prevented three-way calling because it provided for additional prison security, among other things); Wooden v. Norris, 637 F. Supp. 543, 555 (M.D. Tenn. 1986) (holding that a coinless telephone system requiring operator assistance did not infringe on prisoners’ First Amendment rights since it helped to prevent illicit activity between prisoners, fraudulent billing, and vandalism).

265 See, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 835–36 (E.D. Va. 2005) (holding that, if prisoners have other means for confidential communication, monitoring inmate-counsel telephone calls does not infringe prisoners’ Sixth Amendment rights because “prisoners are not entitled to any particular method of access to the courts or to their lawyers”); Bellamy v. McMickens, 692 F. Supp. 205, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying a claim of deprivation when the telephone restrictions were not an absolute denial of access to counsel because “states have no obligation to provide the best manner of access to counsel”); Pino v. Dalshem, 558 F. Supp. 673, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that “the procedures providing for unlimited personal and mail communication with an attorney are constitutionally sufficient,” even though prisoners and their attorneys may prefer to communicate by telephone); Wooden v. Norris, 637 F. Supp. 543, 554 (M.D. Tenn. 1986) (stating that the court would consider both “the alternative means of communication offered by the prison administration” and “the justification” of prisoners in preferring the telephone system in order to determine “the effect the current telephone system and policies have on the ability of inmates’ families to communicate with [them]”).

266 Compare Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying prisoner’s claim that he had been deprived of his First Amendment right to telephone access because he could make calls for emergencies or to his lawyer), with Johnson–El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1051–52 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding a policy limiting pretrial detainees to one call to their attorney every two weeks “patently inadequate” to secure assistance of counsel), and McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1258 (D.N.M. 2003) (finding restrictions, including a ban on attorney visits and a five-minute limit on attorney phone calls, “would unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation”) (quoting Procurier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbot, 490 U.S. 401, 418, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1989)).


269 Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Carter v. O’Sullivan, 924 F. Supp. 903, 911 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (upholding collect call system requiring each prisoner to provide officials with a list of up to thirty individuals the prisoner wished to call).

privacy in outbound calls from prison. Second, prisoners are considered to have consented to monitoring when they receive notice of the surveillance, either by signs near the telephones or informational handbooks. However, as an exception to this general rule, many courts have held prisons must allow unmonitored phone calls between a prisoner and his attorney so long as the phone call is arranged in advance. If such a lawyer-prisoner call is not arranged in advance, it can be monitored like any other call. Courts justify monitoring lawyer-prisoner phone calls that were not pre-arranged by noting that prisoners have the alternative of corresponding with their lawyers confidentially through the mail.

I. Conclusion

Limitations on your right to communicate with the outside world, as discussed in this Chapter, may be among the most frustrating restrictions you have to face while in prison. In most circumstances, prison authorities have great discretion to restrict your right to communicate if they think that the exercise of your right affects legitimate penological interests. You may want to challenge a restriction, or its application to you, if you feel that the restriction is not reasonably related to a legitimate prison interest and violates your constitutional rights. You should be careful, however, that your challenge does not appear frivolous (you must have some specific constitutional basis for making your challenge).

271 See, e.g., United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 291 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “any expectation of privacy in outbound calls from prison is not objectively reasonable and that the Fourth Amendment is therefore not triggered by the routine taping of such calls.”).

272 See, e.g., United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693–94 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a sign placed below telephones warning that calls would be monitored was sufficient notice of surveillance, and that use of the telephones after such notice indicated implied consent); see also United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 894 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that “[a] prisoner's voluntarily made choice . . . to use a telephone he knows may be monitored implies his consent to be monitored”).

273 See generally Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[O]fficials may tape a prisoner's telephone conversations with an attorney only if such tapping does not substantially affect the prisoner's right to confer with counsel.”); but see Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1458 (5th Cir. 1988) (allowing a prison to maintain an unmonitored line for legal calls and monitored lines for all other calls).

274 See, e.g., United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 110–11 (2d Cir. 1998) (allowing “severe” restrictions on a prisoner’s ability to communicate with the outside world because the prisoner could still contact his attorney, among others, through correspondence); Gilday v. Dubois, 124 F.3d 277, 294 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing retention of the right to correspond with counsel and family through the mail as one factor in establishing the reasonableness of a restrictive telephone system); Pino v. Dalsheim, 558 F. Supp. 673, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding “the procedures providing for unlimited personal and mail communication with an attorney are constitutionally sufficient”).

275. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) has a “three strikes” provision requiring prisoners to pay court costs if three of their suits have been dismissed as frivolous (without legal merit) or as failing to state a claim. So, proceed carefully, using this Chapter as a guide to successful and unsuccessful suits. 42 U.S.C. §1997e (2010). For more information on the PLRA, see Chapter 14 of the JLM.